Posts Tagged ‘Special Operations Forces’

Taliban Lack the Will

April 30, 2009

Bottom line: The Taliban lack the will to carry out an effective and sustained close-quarters guerilla campaign against U.S., and even NATO, forces.

They certainly are capable: They have the manpower, the munitions and the TERRAIN to do so.

Sure, they’ll hit Afghan police-manned checkpoints and kill them, or send a suicide bomber into a throng of civilians, or detonate an IED as a NATO convey passes, but these are all peripheral aspects of an asymmetrical war.

In order to be viable, these things must be nitched together within the framework of an overall, comprehensive asymmetrical approach that uses an effective engage and displace policy for their front-line fighters as its crux.

Terrain-features of the Afghan-Pakistan border make up a PARADISE for ambushing operations; and through this terrain U.S. forces patrol daily, and yet, until recently (As outlined below), rarely, if ever, come into any kind of close-quarter ambush combat scenario.

Talibani code of guerilla fighting seems to be to engage American outposts with indirect fire and then flee; just like the tactics favored by their ancestors in ancient times (One reason why the soldiers of the Persian Empire were so disturbed when fighting the Greeks; the Greeks fought face-to-face, whereas the Persians, with their Arab contingents, preferred fighting from a distance via arrows and closing only when a victory seemed certain).

The Taliban as of late, and in very isolated incidents, have been ambushing NATO/U.S. patrols (Not many, but they are starting to walk their talk, or at least trying to give that impression).

One confirmed American patrol was caught in an interesting revenge ambush, which I related in a recent post (Came a week after the same unit devastated a Taliban contingent via setting up their own ambush).

A few others confirmed against NATO forces operating with the Afghan Army.

The Talibani ambushes failed.

The encounters were relatively brief and left the Taliban fleeing amidst the bodies of their fallen comrades, while Coalition/Afghan forces sustained little to no casualties.

But the Taliban are least beginning to actually engage in close-quarters combat again.

When first invaded they tried a somewhat conventional approach, in the form of pitched battles in open areas, in which they were obviously wrecked by overwhelming U.S. military prowess.

After that they withdrew to the mountain areas and would ambush U.S. patrols here and there, but the high level of casualties they would sustain, as compared to the small number on behalf of U.S. and Coalition forces, caused them to back away from the face-to-face ambush scenarios and move more toward the lobbing-mortars-from-a-mile-or-two-away-and-then-fleeing tactic.

More of these real ambushes, and by “real” I mean close-quarters, will come with the influx of U.S. combat troops into the South and Eastern portions of Afghanistan this summer, and especially once said forces begin encroaching upon their opium fields.

<For a related post, see “Cowardice of the Enemy”>


Wrecking Af-Pak (Phase One)

April 21, 2009

Alright then; this is big-time, real-time, will take serious balls.

This effort is phase one of a plan I have developed that would involve the use of U.S. unconventional Special Operations Forces (SOF) to destablilize, confuse and, eventually, destroy the Taliban-Al-Qaida infrastructure in place in the tribal areas in Pakistan, along the border with Afghanistan.

If the U.S. government and affiliated agencies devoted the manpower, resources and BALLS needed to carry out the operation, as documented below, I feel certain it would, on a strategic level, completely revamp global perceptions of the United States and how we operate.

Also, it would secure the drip of power that has increasingly become like a flood flowing into the jowls of Taliban-Al-Qaida factions in Pakistan.


A group of elite American forces, numbering in the thousands, would be trained in the nitty gritty of asymmetrical warfare: They will become the best guerrilla fighters the world has ever seen.


It goes without saying they would have to look like Arabs.

I recall reading an article in a New York Times affiliated newspaper a few years back that reported a raid carried out in an Afghan village by U.S. Special Forces. After the lightning-quick attack, locals were telling reporters that a group of Arabs with full beards had carried it out.

Turned out they were U.S. Special Forces.

So the pretense already exists: Our SOF operating in and around Afghanistan have already undertaken to look like Arabs. Why not broaden this?

The group that would be involved in the first phase of the operation I am detailing would number about 3,500 – all training with the utmost of secrecy.

Initially small groups would infiltrate enemy territory.

They will sunbath daily, to darken the skin; facial hair will be grown into full beards (facial hair follicle transplants for those who can’t) and dye to darken the hair. They will learn the language(s) of the area(s) in which they will be operating, along with the specific dialects.

They will specialize in unorthodox methods of warfare; and while they train the CIA, namely the Special Activities Division (SAD), will step up their activities drastically in Pakistan, where they already have a large presence.

A operational hypothetical involving the opening engagement phase of this operation will be as follows:

Three units of these specially trained American fighters (Force A, Force B and Force C), each numbering 350 men, will infiltrate Pakistan via indirect routes, under the cover of darkness.

These three groups will be augmented by several groups of similiarly training SOF, numbering 50-100 each, to secure flanks and spread further confusion and hamper enemy movement.

They will not simply march in via column formation; perhaps groups will be inserted at a time, and meet up at designated rendezvous points.

The three main units will be operating deep into the rear operating areas of the Taliban and their respective client militias.

The U.S. forces will be wearing Arab clothing common for the area, and will fight using weaponry associated with such insurgent groups: They will have no U.S. air support, no large-scale artillery.

Instead, they will use AK-47s, mortars, light to heavy machine-guns, grenades, rocket-propelled grenades, etc.

Group A will attack a Taliban stronghold, some kind of village, at night.

The unsuspected Taliban fighters will be destroyed, and those remaining will be routed.

Group A will then cut the heads off the dead enemy and stick them onto stakes surrounding the village, forming a ring of sorts, along with some kind of symbol of the Taliban.

And what says Taliban? What is their signature? The black turban.

On each stake, below the head at the top, tie an unraveled black turban to the stake and have it spiraling toward the ground.

Message: Taliban got fucked up here, Taliban stay away, be afraid.


Upon conversing with an associate of mine, perhaps the staking of Taliban heads on pikes surrounding the villages of conquered Taliban strongholds by American elite forces operating under the guise of an unknown “Arab militia” is a bit much, in realist terms, when taking into account the standards of American morality as a global beacon.

So, instead of putting the heads of dead combatants on pikes, we’ll just pile the bodies into large mounds at the village center, with their black turbans scattered about like wild desert rollers blown in the breeze of devastated late-afternoon.>


Group A would then displace and leave the area, dissolve into the terrain and hide.

Meanwhile, when Taliban reinforcements reach the attacked and conquered village, the only people around will be stunned, confused villagers talking about how a group of Arabs stormed the place and caused all this damage.

So now the Taliban will be asking: Who did this? A rival faction? Have the Americans paid of some outback tribal group to do this?

Confusion and dissension will be born, and their minds will begin churning around all the possibilities of betrayal, revenge, etc.

At about this time, Group B, operating say 100 miles to the northwest, will carry out a similiar attack against another Taliban strong-point, and will again disappear, leaving only the grissly remains and the symbolic stakes rooted into the ground around the village’s periphery, or simply a MOUND of dead enemy combatants at the village center.

The location for this second attack will be far enough away so as to give the impression that the first attacking party could not possibly have transversed the grounds in time to carry out the second attack; or could they?

Now what? Ghost divisions? What’s happening?

Meanwhile Group C will be holding in a mid-point between Group A and B, acting as a quick-reaction force to any sudden counter-moves.

These initial attacks would have to focus on the same Taliban faction; make them think another player has emerged, grappling for power.

I understand the complicated dynamics involved regarding the Afghanistan-Pakistan-India axis, and what has been detailed here in this report is simply a covert, hypothetical and undisclosed military operation targetting the assymetrical fighters of the Taliban, and their client militias, who have been gaining more and more ground in the Pakistani Tribal Belt.

The diplomatic, official push regarding the above-mentioned issues I will not touch upon in this piece.

As the days progress, more such units will be inserted, each consisting of a few hundred men. They will create chaos and confusion: Controlled chaos.

Stronghold after stronghold will fall; confusion, disorientation and paranoia will consume the minds of the Taliban commanders, and their front-line fighters will suffer serious damage to their morale and will to fight.

Some will ask: After this is all said and done, what will the world think of the cutting off of enemy heads and staking them to the ground by the Americans?

Well, the CIA does fucked up things all the time that are not disclosed; and the U.S. government could either refuse to comment, or disclose an “alliance” with local “tribal entities.”

This is Phase One.