Archive for the ‘Pakistan’ Category

Taliban Lack the Will

April 30, 2009

Bottom line: The Taliban lack the will to carry out an effective and sustained close-quarters guerilla campaign against U.S., and even NATO, forces.

They certainly are capable: They have the manpower, the munitions and the TERRAIN to do so.

Sure, they’ll hit Afghan police-manned checkpoints and kill them, or send a suicide bomber into a throng of civilians, or detonate an IED as a NATO convey passes, but these are all peripheral aspects of an asymmetrical war.

In order to be viable, these things must be nitched together within the framework of an overall, comprehensive asymmetrical approach that uses an effective engage and displace policy for their front-line fighters as its crux.

Terrain-features of the Afghan-Pakistan border make up a PARADISE for ambushing operations; and through this terrain U.S. forces patrol daily, and yet, until recently (As outlined below), rarely, if ever, come into any kind of close-quarter ambush combat scenario.

Talibani code of guerilla fighting seems to be to engage American outposts with indirect fire and then flee; just like the tactics favored by their ancestors in ancient times (One reason why the soldiers of the Persian Empire were so disturbed when fighting the Greeks; the Greeks fought face-to-face, whereas the Persians, with their Arab contingents, preferred fighting from a distance via arrows and closing only when a victory seemed certain).

The Taliban as of late, and in very isolated incidents, have been ambushing NATO/U.S. patrols (Not many, but they are starting to walk their talk, or at least trying to give that impression).

One confirmed American patrol was caught in an interesting revenge ambush, which I related in a recent post (Came a week after the same unit devastated a Taliban contingent via setting up their own ambush).

A few others confirmed against NATO forces operating with the Afghan Army.

The Talibani ambushes failed.

The encounters were relatively brief and left the Taliban fleeing amidst the bodies of their fallen comrades, while Coalition/Afghan forces sustained little to no casualties.

But the Taliban are least beginning to actually engage in close-quarters combat again.

When first invaded they tried a somewhat conventional approach, in the form of pitched battles in open areas, in which they were obviously wrecked by overwhelming U.S. military prowess.

After that they withdrew to the mountain areas and would ambush U.S. patrols here and there, but the high level of casualties they would sustain, as compared to the small number on behalf of U.S. and Coalition forces, caused them to back away from the face-to-face ambush scenarios and move more toward the lobbing-mortars-from-a-mile-or-two-away-and-then-fleeing tactic.

More of these real ambushes, and by “real” I mean close-quarters, will come with the influx of U.S. combat troops into the South and Eastern portions of Afghanistan this summer, and especially once said forces begin encroaching upon their opium fields.

<For a related post, see “Cowardice of the Enemy”>

juice

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Response to Mr. Head in Stars

April 28, 2009

The following is my response to Masood Sharif Khan Khattak’s report, the link to which is:

 http://pakistanpal.wordpress.com/2009/04/28/faltering-us-strategy-pii/

My response:

Alright;

“Replacing military activity with developmental activity.”

Bullshit.

The two go hand in hand. First route the Islamo-Fascists that are the core of the Taliban, and then civilian workers move in and create viable institutions.

Peace deals with the Taliban? Are you reading about the SWAT Peace Accord?
You cannot deal with the Taliban, because they are strongarms.

In the accord, the Taliban agreed to disarm, and to cease all violent/military activities, and in return the Pakistani government would allow them to implement their variant of Sharia law in SWAT and neighboring districts. That was the core of the agreement.

What happened?

Within days, hundreds of heavily armed Taliban marched into Buner, raided civilian-based instituations, routed government officials and occupied their houses.

Yes, they listen to peace deals.

As far as the U.S. withdrawing after said “peace deals” are in place, this is completely absurd.

This is the whole reason why the ISI continues to support the Taliban, because they fear another abandonment by the United States similiar to that which occured when the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan.

Because of this, the ISI uses certain elements of the Taliban, along with other non-state militant entities, as a hedge against both India in Kashmir and Afghanistan (A long-standing border dispute exists between Pakistan and Afghanistan, and Pakistan sees the Taliban as a viable bulwark against potential Afghani trespasses made against the border).

So, we have “peace talks,” and disengage from operations against the Taliban, who claim so strongly they wish to kill every westerner. That would be great wouldn’t it, because then the Taliban will be able to lay down their arms, large swaths will go back to their home countries, and the natives can tend their fields and flocks, right?

No, they will see the weakness of this American approach, and will begin preparations for further advances.

TALIBAN, and fanatical Arab militant groups in general, at the core level, LISTEN AND RESPOND TO VIOLENCE, not talking.

Your point about Indian influence in Afghanistan is certainly valid, and steps do need to be made to curb that.

And large elements of the ISI DO SUPPORT non-state entities such as certain elements of the Taliban as a hedge against India and Afghanistan, this is in Pakistan’s own strategic interest.

The Obama administration is putting forth a huge increase in diplomatic and civilian activity so as to facilitate a stabilizing of Afghanistan.

But you say we should sit back and let the Taliban spread out eh?

Disrupt Taliban/Al Qaida infrastructure via military strikes and covert activities, then install civilian institutions.

We were building a highway in Afghanistan, something the locals in that area had long wanted. The Taliban came in and told them they’d be killed if they continued to support and work on the project; so out of fear they withdrew from the highway development project.

Had we had a military outpost in or near the village, the Taliban’s access would have been severely limited, and the civilian infrastructure program would have proceeded unchecked.

https://juiceempire.wordpress.com/

juice

Pakistan Continues Offensive (2)

April 28, 2009

Now in the third day of fighting, the Pakistani offensive against Taliban positions in the districts bordering the SWAT Valley has expanded into Buner, a newly established Taliban stronghold a mere 60 miles from Islamabad.

Initial operations targeted militants based in Lower Dir – an estimated 70-75 Taliban were killed, along with 10 Pakistani “security personnel,” according to chief Pakistani military spokesman Major General Athar Abbas.

The fighting in Lower Dir, he said, was coming to a close, as operations in Buner have now commenced.

Warplanes, helicopter gunships, heavy artillery and Pakistani army troops, along with elements of the Frontier Corps, are said to be involved in the Buner offensive (with ground units maneuvering into positions while aerial and artillery strikes marked the opening barrage).

In a Guardian report, written by Declan Walsh, a resident of Buner is quoted as saying:

“‘I saw the jet planes earlier and now I can see two helicopters. They are hitting targets in the mountains close to the town,’ resident Jaffar Shah told the Guardian by telephone, shortly after the attack started.”

So, it appears to me, the Taliban are getting wrecked.

Some contributing factors leading to this offensive:

1) Taliban leadership, in recent weeks, called for Sharia law to be implemented across Pakistan, and that the Pakistani constitution should be done away with.

This struck an intense chord with a myriad of political factions within Pakistan who objected to such a claim (Some of whom had actually supported the Taliban initially). The constitution was meticulously drawn up by a group of some 60-plus Islamic scholars and politicians to ensure that it did adhere to Islamic law.

The underlying tone of the Talibani assertion, whether they realized it at the time or not, also made it obvious to Pakistan, if not the world, of their intentions to gain eventual control of the country. They threw that card at the wrong time.

2) They moved, in force and brandishing an array of weaponry, into Buner, just days after signing the SWAT Peace Accord which called for them to disarm and in return they would receive their demand of having Sharia law implemented in SWAT and neighboring districts.

And Buner, about 60 miles from the capital, would be a nice jumping-off point for a surprise infiltration/offensive against the heart of the country, in coordination with other fanatical Islamic groups not directly connected to the Taliban already lying dormant across Punjab Province, in which the federal area of Islamabad is located.

3) Western, namely American, pressure to act. The portrait was painted by Mullen, Holbrooke, Clinton, etc. (See Pakistan Launches Taliban Offensive [1]).

We’ll see what comes of this.

juice

Pakistani launches Taliban Offensive (1)

April 27, 2009

It seems that, while denied by top Pakistani officials, we, the Americans, have successfully persuaded Pakistan to act.

An offensive has been launched yesterday, Sunday, against Taliban elements in the Lower Dir district of the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) – a neighbor of the SWAT Valley.

Said offensive is now in its second day, and scattered reports seem to imply it has carried over into other limited areas of the NWFP – although details regarding the expansion of operations are slim at this point.

It seems elements of Pakistan’s Frontier Corps, a smattering of tribal entities pulled together into a cohesive unit numbering about 80,000, are the spearhead of this offensive, and are being supported by air forces and ground-based artillery/armor.

Now, the Pakistanis, to save face of course, and to try to deconstruct the image of them as puppets of Western, namely American, influence, deny that this offensive is a cave-in to American pressure to act.

And yet it’s quite obvious, given the near-perpetual string of high-level talks between America and Pakistan in the past number of weeks (Namely between Admiral Mullen [the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and therefore the highest ranked military officer in America] and what is essentially his counter-part in the Pakistani military, General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, Chief of Army Staff) that this offensive is a direct response to candid advice given to the Pakistani government/military by the American military and affiliated agencies.

Perhaps our top commanders (Military, CIA, and diplomatic [the pitbull Richard Holbrooke]) have finally painted a more holistic, sweeping picture of Pakistan’s fate if they fail to deal with the newly embolded Taliban (After having the SWAT Peace Accord officially recognized and signed recently) as they methodically sweep from district to district in the NWFP.

And this picture painted by the U.S. would not simply encompass the strategic failure of having more and more of Pakistan under the thumb of Talibani elements, but also would bring into focus other, more indirect matters, such as economic aid given to Pakistan, which President Obama has made clear will from this point on be determined by “benchmarks” of progress (not officially defined as of now) regarding Pakistan’s commitment to fighting radical elements within their country; namely within the NWFP.

I certainly put forth the notion that we are supplying them intelligence and logistal support regarding these most recent strikes against Taliban strongholds in Lower Dir and, most likely, other areas of the NWFP.

One of many questions that come to my mind regarding this most recent offensive: How serious is it?

In scope and expected level of intensity, is this just a show of potential strength by Pakistan to get America to shut up?

I will say it comes at an excellent annual juncture, as the traditional Afghan-Pakistan tribal “fighting season” is about to commence, as crops are harvested and the weather improves. This Pakistani offensive will at the very least disrupt Taliban preparations for the incoming influx of 17,000 American combat troops who are scheduled to arrive, within the coming month or two, in the very Afghani provinces in which Taliban activity has spiked in recent months.

The New York Times is reporting that this offensive is a ” prelude to a larger one against the Taliban in Buner in the coming days, according to a government official who declined to be named because he was not authorized to speak to the news media.”

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/27/world/asia/27pstan.html?_r=1&ref=world

Buner, a neighbor of SWAT, was infiltrated by large numbers of Taliban fighters last week. After “talks” with the Council of Elders for the region, the Taliban agreed to withdraw. That withdrawal is dubious, as reports are still coming in of armed Taliban fighters roaming in at least one border village of Buner.

Other reports from the New York Times claim that, while the initial Taliban forces that invaded and consolidated control over Buner have withdrawn, elements of “local” Taliban entities still maintain control over strategic areas of Buner, and are looting supplies.

Some analysts are saying this Pakistani offensive jeopardizes the SWAT Peace Accord.

Bullshit.

The Accord called for the Taliban to lay down their arms and in return Sharia law would be implemented in the SWAT Valley and neighboring districts.

And then, within days of this being officially signed by the Pakistani president, heavily armed Taliban forces enter Buner. Ha.

Hopefully Pakistan is beginning to see the absurdity in trying to deal with the Taliban.

Time will tell.

 

juice

 

One news outlet detailing the initial progress of the offensive is:

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/8019518.stm

In this report, the BBC reports:

“A militant commander was among a number of militants killed in gun battles in the Lower Dir district of North West Frontier Province, the military said.”

And also:

“Helicopter gunships and tanks were reportedly used in the fighting.

There was no immediate word of casualties from the Taleban and independent sources have not been able to verify the army’s claims.

Pakistani interior ministry chief Rehman Malik has repeated his call for the Taleban to disarm.

‘Enough is enough,’ told a TV channel on Sunday.

‘We have decided to flush them out. The peace accord was linked to peace. When there is no peace, there is no use for that accord.’

The clashes seem to suggest that the government has finally decided to try to stop the spread of the Taleban across northern Pakistan, the BBC’s Mark Dummett reports from the Pakistani capital, Islamabad.”

Cowardice of The Enemy

April 24, 2009

Taliban-style ambush is, generally speaking, as follows:

A small group, say 12-20 fighters, will pitch up on a ridgeline a mile from an American outpost in Afghanistan, and will commence firing mortars, rifles, etc., and then disappear.

Bullshit.

These fuckers claim to be fighting JIHAD, right? Jihad against the American infidels – and martyrdom is the fruit of death while fighting against the evil Americans, and rewards abound in the afterlife…This is what they say, right?

Then why not fight? Why not BALL UP and ambush our patrols in close quarters, like the Viet Cong of olden times?

Because they are full of shit pussies…And this can be found in virtually all fanatical Islamic armed factions that declare their official purpose as being to “destroy the enemy,” whether it’s America, Israel, etc.

But they don’t fight. They hide.

Sure, they are faced by overwhelming military superiority, so a pitched battle is out of the question. But they won’t even employ the basic tenets of the guerilla warfare they claim to champion. 

This is something that really irritates me. Man up and fight, or shut the fuck up and tend your flocks.

I mean, good grief man.

I recall reading an article from a New York Times affiliated newspaper some months back that reported on an American outpost coming under direct frontal assault by a Taliban contingent numbering around 300 fighters.

The outpost, newly created, had a force of 30-50 American soldiers who, with the help of air support, fought off the attacking force.

Taliban got wrecked, but at least they walked their talk.

Nowadays, I read no reports of American patrols coming under concerted ambush by the Taliban.

Sure, they’ll put an IED on the side of the road and detonate it as a convoy of NATO troops, or Afghan securty personnel, pass.

And of course they love suicide bombing CIVILIANS, oh what BALLS!

 You want to fight us, Mr. Taliban, as you so vehemently claim (that is, afterall, the official reason for your existence, right?) then fucking fight us.

We have patrols roaming the countryside along the border with Afghanistan daily; why don’t you hit them? You’re afraid of air-power? That makes sense, that’s why you ENGAGE AND DISPLACE.

By no means am I encouraging the Taliban to carry out attacks against U.S. forces, or any forces for that matter, I’m simply pointing out the pussiness of these pieces of shit who claim their whole life’s purpose is to FIGHT AND KILL US.

I enjoyed reading the April 17, 2009 edition of The New York Times, in which a report was given of a U.S. platoon of 30 soldiers carrying out a devastating ambush against Taliban forces as they climbed a ridge to fire some pop-shots at a nearby American outpost in the valley below.

Oh yes, the Taliban were ambushed, an ambush that was actually an ambush, and they got their asses beaten down. Ya, only 13 confirmed kills (no American dead or wounded), but it’s still quite refreshing to read of such a thorough turning of the tables – but more than that, we actually ambushed them, as opposed to standing a mile away and lobbing some mortars and then high-tailing it into the mountains.

The article is as follows:

April 17, 2009

Turning Tables, U.S. Troops Ambush Taliban With Swift and Lethal Results

 By C. J. CHIVERS

 KORANGAL OUTPOST, Afghanistan — Only the lead insurgents were disciplined as they walked along the ridge. They moved carefully, with weapons ready and at least five yards between each man, the soldiers who surprised them said.

Behind them, a knot of Taliban fighters walked in a denser group, some with rifles slung on their shoulders — “pretty much exactly the way we tell soldiers not to do it,” said Specialist Robert Soto, the radio operator for the American patrol.

If these insurgents came close enough, the soldiers knew, the patrol could kill them in a batch.

Fight by fight, the infantryman’s war in Afghanistan is often waged on the Taliban’s terms. Insurgents ambush convoys and patrols from high ridges or long ranges and slip away as the Americans, weighed down by equipment, return fire and call for air and artillery support. Last week a patrol from the First Infantry Division reversed the routine.

An American platoon surprised an armed Taliban column on a forested ridgeline at night, and killed at least 13 insurgents, and perhaps many more, with rifles, machine guns, Claymore mines, hand grenades and a knife.

The one-sided fight, fought on the slopes of the same mountain where a Navy Seal patrol was surrounded in 2005 and a helicopter with reinforcements was shot down, does not change the war. It was one of hundreds of firefights that have occurred in the Korangal Valley, an isolated region where local insurgents and the Americans have been locked in a bitter stalemate for more than three years.

But as accounts of the fight have spread, the ambush, on Good Friday, has become an emotional rallying point for soldiers in Kunar Province, who have seen it as a both a validation of their equipment and training and a welcome bit of score-settling in an area that in recent years has claimed more American lives than any other.

The patrol, 30 soldiers from the First Battalion, 26th Infantry, had left this outpost before noon on April 10, and spent much of the day climbing a ridge on the opposite side of the Korangal River, according to interviews with more than half the participants.

Once the soldiers reached the ridge’s crest, almost 6,000 feet above sea level on the side of a peak called Sautalu Sar, they found fresh footprints on the trails, and parapets of rock from where Taliban fighters often fire rifles and rocket-propelled grenades down onto this outpost.

The platoon leader, Second Lt. Justin Smith, selected a spot where trails intersected, and the platoon dug shallow fighting holes before dark. Claymore antipersonnel mines were set among the trees nearby.

At sunset, Lieutenant Smith called for a period of absolute silence, which lasted into darkness. Then he ordered three scouts to sit in a listening post about 100 yards away, 10 feet off the trail.

The scouts set in. Less than a half-minute later, a column of Taliban fighters appeared, walking briskly their way.

Sgt. Zachary R. Reese, a sniper, whispered into his radio. “We have eight enemy personnel coming down on our position really fast,” he said. He could say no more; the Taliban fighters were a few feet away.

More appeared. Then more still. The sergeant counted 26 gunmen pass by.

The patrol, Second Platoon of Company B, was in a place where no Americans had spent a night for years, and it seemed that the Afghans did not expect danger.

The soldiers waited. The rules of the ambush were long ago drilled into them: no one can move, and no one can fire until the patrol leader gives the order. Then everyone must fire at once.

The third Taliban fighter in the column switched on a flashlight, the soldiers said, and quickly switched it off. About 50 yards separated the two sides, but Lieutenant Smith did not want to start shooting too soon, he said, “because if too many lived then we’d be up there fighting them all night.”

He let the Taliban column continue on. The soldiers trained their weapons’ infrared lasers, which are visible only with night-vision equipment, on the fighters as they drew closer. The lasers mark the path a bullet will fly.

The lead fighter had almost reached the platoon when Pvt. First Class Troy Pacini-Harvey, 19, his laser trained on the lead man’s forehead, moved his rifle’s selector lever from safe to semi-automatic. It made a barely audible click. The Taliban fighter froze. He was six feet away.

Lieutenant Smith was new to the platoon. This was his fourth patrol. He was in a situation that every infantry lieutenant trains for, but almost no infantry lieutenant ever sees. “Fire,” he said, softly into the radio. “Fire. Fire. Fire.”

The platoon’s frontage exploded with noise and flashes of light as soldiers fired. Bullets struck all of the lead Taliban fighters, the soldiers said. The first Afghans fell where they were hit, not managing to fire a single shot.

Five Taliban fighters bolted to the soldiers’ left, unwittingly running squarely into the path of machine-gun bullets and the Claymore mines. For a moment, the soldiers heard rustling in the brush. They detonated their Claymores and threw hand grenades. The rustling stopped.

Two other Taliban fighters had dashed to the right, toward an almost sheer drop. One ran so wildly in the blackness that his momentum carried him off the cliff, several soldiers said.

Another stopped at the edge. Pvt. First Class Brad Larson, 19, had followed the man with his laser. “I took him out,” he said.

The scout at the listening post shot three of the fleeing fighters, and dropped two more with hand grenades. “We stopped what we could see,” Sergeant Reese said.

The shooting had lasted a few minutes. The hillside briefly fell quiet. The surviving Taliban fighters, some of whom had run back up the trail, began shouting in the darkness. “We could hear them calling out to one another,” Specialist Soto said.

Lieutenant Smith called the listening post back in. After two Apache attack helicopters showed up, an F-15 dropped a bomb on the Taliban’s escape route, about 600 yards up the trail. Then the lieutenant ordered teams to search the bodies they could find on the crest.

Sergeant Reese gave his rifle to another sniper to cover him while he tried to cut away a Taliban fighter’s ammunition pouches with a four-inch blade. The fighter had only been pretending to be dead, the soldiers said. He lunged for Sergeant Reese, who stabbed him in the left eye.

In all, the soldiers found eight bodies on the crest. They photographed them to try to identify them later, and collected their weapons, ammunition, radios and papers. Then the patrol swept down a gully where a pilot said he saw more insurgents hiding.

Four scouts, using night-vision gear, spotted five fighters crouching behind rocks, and killed them with rifle and machine-gun fire, the scouts said. The bodies were searched and photographed, too. The platoon began to hike back to the outpost, carrying the captured equipment.

Second Platoon, Company B has endured one of the most arduous assignments in Afghanistan. Eight of the platoon’s soldiers have been wounded in nine months of fighting in the valley, part of a bitter contest for control of a small and sparsely populated area.

Three others have been killed.

In a matter of minutes, the ambush changed the experience of the surviving soldiers’ tours. The degree of turnabout surprised even some the soldiers who participated.

“It’s the first time most of us have even seen the guys who were shooting at us,” said Sgt. Thomas Horvath, 21.

The next day, elders from the valley would ask permission to collect the villages’ dead. Company B’s commander, Capt. James C. Howell, would grant it.

But already, as the soldiers slid and climbed down the mountain, word of the insurgents’ defeat was traveling through Taliban networks.

Specialist Robert C. Oxman, 21, had put a dead fighter’s phone in his pocket. As the platoon descended, the phone rang and rang, apparently as other fighters called to find out what had happened on Sautalu Sar. By sunrise, it had been ringing for hours.

Copyright 2009 The New York Times Company

juice

Wrecking Af-Pak (Phase One)

April 21, 2009

Alright then; this is big-time, real-time, will take serious balls.

This effort is phase one of a plan I have developed that would involve the use of U.S. unconventional Special Operations Forces (SOF) to destablilize, confuse and, eventually, destroy the Taliban-Al-Qaida infrastructure in place in the tribal areas in Pakistan, along the border with Afghanistan.

If the U.S. government and affiliated agencies devoted the manpower, resources and BALLS needed to carry out the operation, as documented below, I feel certain it would, on a strategic level, completely revamp global perceptions of the United States and how we operate.

Also, it would secure the drip of power that has increasingly become like a flood flowing into the jowls of Taliban-Al-Qaida factions in Pakistan.

—————————————————————-

A group of elite American forces, numbering in the thousands, would be trained in the nitty gritty of asymmetrical warfare: They will become the best guerrilla fighters the world has ever seen.

How?

It goes without saying they would have to look like Arabs.

I recall reading an article in a New York Times affiliated newspaper a few years back that reported a raid carried out in an Afghan village by U.S. Special Forces. After the lightning-quick attack, locals were telling reporters that a group of Arabs with full beards had carried it out.

Turned out they were U.S. Special Forces.

So the pretense already exists: Our SOF operating in and around Afghanistan have already undertaken to look like Arabs. Why not broaden this?

The group that would be involved in the first phase of the operation I am detailing would number about 3,500 – all training with the utmost of secrecy.

Initially small groups would infiltrate enemy territory.

They will sunbath daily, to darken the skin; facial hair will be grown into full beards (facial hair follicle transplants for those who can’t) and dye to darken the hair. They will learn the language(s) of the area(s) in which they will be operating, along with the specific dialects.

They will specialize in unorthodox methods of warfare; and while they train the CIA, namely the Special Activities Division (SAD), will step up their activities drastically in Pakistan, where they already have a large presence.

A operational hypothetical involving the opening engagement phase of this operation will be as follows:

Three units of these specially trained American fighters (Force A, Force B and Force C), each numbering 350 men, will infiltrate Pakistan via indirect routes, under the cover of darkness.

These three groups will be augmented by several groups of similiarly training SOF, numbering 50-100 each, to secure flanks and spread further confusion and hamper enemy movement.

They will not simply march in via column formation; perhaps groups will be inserted at a time, and meet up at designated rendezvous points.

The three main units will be operating deep into the rear operating areas of the Taliban and their respective client militias.

The U.S. forces will be wearing Arab clothing common for the area, and will fight using weaponry associated with such insurgent groups: They will have no U.S. air support, no large-scale artillery.

Instead, they will use AK-47s, mortars, light to heavy machine-guns, grenades, rocket-propelled grenades, etc.

Group A will attack a Taliban stronghold, some kind of village, at night.

The unsuspected Taliban fighters will be destroyed, and those remaining will be routed.

Group A will then cut the heads off the dead enemy and stick them onto stakes surrounding the village, forming a ring of sorts, along with some kind of symbol of the Taliban.

And what says Taliban? What is their signature? The black turban.

On each stake, below the head at the top, tie an unraveled black turban to the stake and have it spiraling toward the ground.

Message: Taliban got fucked up here, Taliban stay away, be afraid.

<Update:

Upon conversing with an associate of mine, perhaps the staking of Taliban heads on pikes surrounding the villages of conquered Taliban strongholds by American elite forces operating under the guise of an unknown “Arab militia” is a bit much, in realist terms, when taking into account the standards of American morality as a global beacon.

So, instead of putting the heads of dead combatants on pikes, we’ll just pile the bodies into large mounds at the village center, with their black turbans scattered about like wild desert rollers blown in the breeze of devastated late-afternoon.>

Nice.

Group A would then displace and leave the area, dissolve into the terrain and hide.

Meanwhile, when Taliban reinforcements reach the attacked and conquered village, the only people around will be stunned, confused villagers talking about how a group of Arabs stormed the place and caused all this damage.

So now the Taliban will be asking: Who did this? A rival faction? Have the Americans paid of some outback tribal group to do this?

Confusion and dissension will be born, and their minds will begin churning around all the possibilities of betrayal, revenge, etc.

At about this time, Group B, operating say 100 miles to the northwest, will carry out a similiar attack against another Taliban strong-point, and will again disappear, leaving only the grissly remains and the symbolic stakes rooted into the ground around the village’s periphery, or simply a MOUND of dead enemy combatants at the village center.

The location for this second attack will be far enough away so as to give the impression that the first attacking party could not possibly have transversed the grounds in time to carry out the second attack; or could they?

Now what? Ghost divisions? What’s happening?

Meanwhile Group C will be holding in a mid-point between Group A and B, acting as a quick-reaction force to any sudden counter-moves.

These initial attacks would have to focus on the same Taliban faction; make them think another player has emerged, grappling for power.

I understand the complicated dynamics involved regarding the Afghanistan-Pakistan-India axis, and what has been detailed here in this report is simply a covert, hypothetical and undisclosed military operation targetting the assymetrical fighters of the Taliban, and their client militias, who have been gaining more and more ground in the Pakistani Tribal Belt.

The diplomatic, official push regarding the above-mentioned issues I will not touch upon in this piece.

As the days progress, more such units will be inserted, each consisting of a few hundred men. They will create chaos and confusion: Controlled chaos.

Stronghold after stronghold will fall; confusion, disorientation and paranoia will consume the minds of the Taliban commanders, and their front-line fighters will suffer serious damage to their morale and will to fight.

Some will ask: After this is all said and done, what will the world think of the cutting off of enemy heads and staking them to the ground by the Americans?

Well, the CIA does fucked up things all the time that are not disclosed; and the U.S. government could either refuse to comment, or disclose an “alliance” with local “tribal entities.”

This is Phase One.

juice